Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently passed a new law on patients'right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that di¤er in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care …nancing and welfare. A decentralised solution without patient mobility leads to too low (high) quality and too few (many) patients being treated in the high-skill (low-skill) region. A centralised solution with patient mobility implements the …rst best, but the low-skill region would not be willing to transfer authority as its welfare is lower than without mobility. In a decentralised solution, the e¤ects of patient mobility depend on the transfer payment. If the payment is below marginal cost, mobility leads to a 'race-to-the-bottom'in quality and lower welfare in both regions. If the payment is equal to marginal cost, quality and welfare remain unchanged in the high-skill region, but the low-skill region bene…ts. For a socially optimal payment, which is higher than marginal cost, quality levels in the two regions are closer to (but not at) the …rst best, but welfare is lower in the low-skill region. Thus, patient mobility can have adverse e¤ects on quality provision and welfare unless an appropriate transfer payment scheme is implemented.
Introduction
Cross-border patient mobility is a key issue in the European Union at the moment. Despite the fact that patients in EU member states are allowed to seek health care in other EU countries, patient mobility is still very low, especially for planned health care treatments. 1 A natural explanation for low mobility is that patients prefer to be treated in their home country. However, there might be other causes. Patients might be denied access and/or reimbursement if they demand treatment in a foreign EU country. 2 In March 2011 the EU council passed a new law that gives citizens in EU countries the right to choose among health care providers across all EU member states. 3 The new law intends to limit the scope for EU countries (or providers within EU countries) to deny foreign EU citizens access to their health care provision. The law also explicitly states that EU countries cannot refuse to reimburse patients who seek cross-border medical treatment when this treatment is covered in their home country. 4 Thus, by lowering important barriers for patients seeking care in another EU country, the new law is likely to stimulate patient mobility across EU member states.
In this paper we ask whether patient mobility is desirable or not from a welfare perspective.
Clearly, the answer to this question relies on what are the e¤ects of patient mobility on the provision and …nancing of health care within each country, which is what we will study in detail. While our paper is motivated by the on-going debate and the new legislation in the EU on cross-border medical treatment, our analysis also applies to patient mobility within country borders, where regions are separate jurisdictions. For example, Sweden has a decentralised health care system, which is …nanced primarily through taxes levied by county councils and municipalities. County councils also regulate the level of service o¤ered by the providers. In 2003 a 'free choice reform'was implemented, which allows patients to apply for health care outside their home county, though needing to pay out-of- 1 According to the EU Commission (2006) the demand for cross-border health care represents only around 1% of public spending on health care, which is currently around e10 billion. This estimate includes cross-border health care which patients had not planned in advance (such as emergency care), which means less than 1% of the expenditure and movement of patients is for planned cross-border health care, like hip and knee operations or cataract surgery. 2 Several EU Court cases illustrate the problem where patients are refused reimbursement by the home country for cross-border treatment; see, e.g., Case C-158/96 [Kohll, 1998 ], Case C-120/95 [Decker, 1998 ] and Case C-372/04 [Watts, 2006] . Although the EU Court decided in favour of the patients, it is still likely that patients face uncertainty and costs related to reimbursement for cross-border treatment. See, e.g., the EU commision (2006) for a discussion of these cases. 3 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients'rights in cross-border healthcare. 4 The EU directive (chapter III) de…nes some basic principles for the cross-border reimbursement, but is not very speci…c on the transfer payments across the member states and the reimbursement to patients seeking cross-border care. Thus, the EU member states have some discretion in designing the reimbursement rules. pocket for the extra travel costs. The home county would need to compensate the county providing the treatment to their residents. Similarly, in Italy each Region is responsible for the provision of health care. However, many patients seek care in a di¤erent Region from the one where they reside and a system of transfers is in place: 'importing'Regions are compensated on the basis of the number of patients treated from the 'exporting'ones. In Canada, Provinces are responsible for the provision of health care. Mobility across Provinces is generally limited to emergency and sudden illness or allowed only in special circumstances (for example a specialised treatment not o¤ered in a Province) under prior approval.
Relatively little is known and understood about patient mobility and its consequences for health care provision, health care …nancing and regional and global (inter-regional) welfare. We aim to contribute towards …lling this gap in the literature. In order to analyse patient mobility across separate jurisdictions, we make use of a Hotelling model with two regions. Health care is …nanced through income taxation. Patients receive care for free at the point of consumption, but face the cost of travelling to the provider for treatment. The policy makers in each region decide on the quality of health care provision in their region and the corresponding tax rate to …nance their health care expenditures. The regions are identical except for their technology in providing health care quality, e.g., due to access to more skilled doctors, better medical technology, better facilities, etc. All else equal, the high-skill region will o¤er higher health care quality than the low-skill region. This is the source of patient mobility in our model.
The objective of our study is twofold. First, we compare the decentralised system with no mobility (for example the old system within the EU) with a centralised one. We show that a centralised solution implements the …rst best. Although we do not envisage the EU taking over the funding of health care systems directly, the centralised solution remains a useful benchmark as total welfare is highest under this solution: it coincides with the …rst best. Second, and most importantly, we compare the decentralised system with no mobility (again the old system within the EU) with a decentralised system where mobility is allowed and (potentially) a system of transfers can be put in place (the new system within the EU).
Centralisation versus decentralisation with no mobility. Compared to a decentralised system with no mobility, a centralised provision of quality which allows mobility is welfare improving. Since the two regions di¤er in their quality, the patient at the border between the high-and low-skill region is willing to travel further to obtain the extra quality of care. Therefore a decentralised system with no mobility implies that the high-skill (low-skill) region treats too few (too many) patients.
It also implies too low quality in the high-skill region and too high quality in the low-skill region.
Since demand is higher (lower) for the high-skill (low-skill) region under the centralised solution, the optimal quality is higher (lower). In the high-skill region patients are better o¤ under a centralised system since they receive higher quality. In the low-skill region the e¤ect on patients' utility from health gains is mixed: patients who travel from the low-skill to the high-skill region bene…t from the higher quality provided in this region, but patients who stay in the low-skill region have lower quality compared to a decentralised solution. Whether each region pays more or less taxes under a centralised solution is in general indeterminate. However, we show that if the cost of quality provision takes a quadratic form, health expenditures are higher in the high-skill region and it bene…ts from an implicit subsidy from the low-skill region so that the high-skill (low-skill) region is overall better (worse) o¤ under centralisation.
The result that allowing mobility under a centralised solution is welfare improving does not necessarily imply that it is welfare improving under a decentralised one. It however shows that it has the potential to improve welfare. As we discuss below, whether mobility increases or reduces welfare depends on the system of transfers between the di¤erent regions, which is at the core of the EU discussion on how to regulate mobility.
Decentralisation with mobility versus decentralisation without mobility. Compared to a decentralised system without mobility, allowing mobility without any form of transfers generates a 'race to the bottom'with lower quality in both regions. This arises because the high-skill region has a lower marginal bene…t from quality: higher quality attracts patients from the low-skill region, but does not generate any revenues. The low-skill region also has poor incentives to increase quality: lower quality shifts more patients to the high-skill region which reduces costs. An important implication is therefore that allowing mobility within the EU without any form of transfer system is undesirable.
The comparison leads to di¤erent conclusions if a system of transfers is in place. Suppose that the low-skill region pays a price equal to the marginal cost for every patient treated by the highskill region. In this case, decentralisation with mobility can generate a (weak) Pareto improvement compared to decentralisation without mobility. The high-skill region is indi¤erent but the lowskill region is better o¤. The high-skill region is indi¤erent because the marginal cost of treating the patients is exactly compensated by the price. The low-skill region bene…ts because patients who move to the high-skill region receive higher quality which in turn reduces the incentive of the low-skill region to provide quality. This result implies that within the EU a price system can be introduced which makes every country better o¤: countries that import patients can be compensated by an adequate price and countries that export patients can bene…t from the higher quality.
A transfer system with a price equal to the marginal cost is generally not optimal. The optimal price which maximises the sum of the regions' welfare is strictly above the marginal cost but does not generate a Pareto improvement. The high-skill region now strictly gains thanks to the positive revenues generated by mobility and the low-skill region loses due to the higher payments to the highskill region. Introducing such a transfer system may then be faced by stronger opposition. Within the EU this result implies that although the optimal price should be set strictly above the marginal cost to further encourage the high-skill regions to increase quality, this may be faced by the opposition of low-skill regions.
The optimal price which maximises total welfare under a decentralised solution generates nevertheless a lower welfare than under a centralised solution (which coincides with the …rst best). We show that a more sophisticated transfer system which entails a price paid to the high-skill region which is di¤erent from the price paid by the low-skill region does not lead to any further welfare improvements. This result holds regardless of how the extra tax bill (due to di¤erent prices) is shared between the two regions, and it arises because a marginal increase in the price paid to the high-skill region or in the price paid by the low-skill region leads to a higher quality in both regions.
One implication of this result is that there is no need for the EU to develop a complex payment system where the price paid by exporting countries is di¤erent from the importing ones, with price di¤erences …nanced through the EU budget. Instead a system with only one price is su¢ cient to maximise welfare.
We believe our paper is the …rst to study the impact of patient mobility on the provision and …nancing of health care across jurisdictions (regions or countries). 5 In the health economics literature there is a vast amount of papers studying the relationship between competition between health 5 There is a paper by Petretto (2000) that looks at regionalisation of a National Health Service. It provides conditions for establishing whether devolution for health care expenditure is desirable. Variations in health expenditure will depend on its marginal bene…t and the marginal cost of public funds, including higher or lower transfers originating from mobility. However, this paper has no explicit spatial dimension and it is not concerned with the quality of care. It is thus very di¤erent from ours. care providers and their quality incentives. 6 A main lesson from this literature is that competition increases health care quality if prices are …xed (above marginal costs) and providers are pro…tmaximisers. However, if providers are altruistic (i.e., care about their patients), then the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous (Brekke, Siciliani and Straume, 2011) . The same result applies when providers also compete in prices, since then more competition depresses the pro…t margin of the providers, which reduces the incentive for investing in quality.
Our paper has clear parallels to this literature, since we allow patients to demand care by a competing health care provider in another region. We could also reinterpret the decentralised (centralised) solution as the competition (monopoly) solution. The question is then whether we simply can transfer the results from the previous literature to an interjurisdictional setting. 7 Our analysis and results show that the answer is no. The quality incentives are determined by a trade-o¤ between the marginal bene…t of higher quality and the marginal cost (which is the tax rate) to the patient. We show that this trade-o¤ depends critically on the transfer payments applying to cross-border patient ‡ows, which in turn determine the regional welfare e¤ects of patient mobility. Thus, our analysis provides novel insights into the provision of health care quality in an interjurisdictional setting.
Our paper also relates to the economic literature on …scal federalism, 8 in particular the part of this literature concerned with cross-border shopping. The seminal work by Kanbur and Keen (1993) provides a Hotelling model with two countries that di¤er in size (i.e., population density), where consumers either buy the (private) product in their home country or travel to the neighbouring country if the tax rate is signi…cantly low. There is free entry of …rms, implying a …rm at every consumers' 'doorstep'. Assuming that governments are Leviathans, they show that the Nash equilibrium implies that the small country sets a lower tax rate, inducing cross-border shopping from residents in the large country. They also show that tax competition is harmful for both countries, in particular, when the di¤erence in size is large, implying a scope for tax coordination policies. 9 Cremer and Gahvari (2000), who study tax evasion and …scal competition, modify the Kanbur-Keen model by introducing a public good that is …nanced through taxation on the private good. 6 See Gaynor (2006) for an excellent review of the literature on competition and quality in health care markets. 7 There is a paper by Aiura and Sanjo (2010) that uses a Hotelling model with two regions that di¤er in their population density to study incentives for health care quality. While this paper shares some similarities in the demand structure, the focus is very di¤erent as they study the impact of privatisation of local public hospitals. 8 For excellent reviews of the literature on …scal federalism, see Oates (1999 Oates ( , 2001 ). 9 Similar results are derived by Trandel (1994) , who assumes di¤erent population densities, Wang (1999) , who analyses the Stackelberg equilibrium, and Nielsen (2001), who assumes a transport cost on the commodities. They also assume that governments maximise welfare rather than being Leviathans. In this sense the paper by Cremer and Gahvari is closer to ours. However, our paper di¤ers from the literature on cross-border shopping despite some similarities. First, in our model cross-border shopping is motivated by di¤erences in the quality of -rather than the tax on -the good. Taxation in our model is based on the location of the consumer, not on the location of the product. 10 Second, we assume the private product to be publicly funded (through income taxation), implying an explicit link between the tax rate and the provision of the private good. Thus, the incentives for increasing taxes in our model are very di¤erent from those in Kanbur and Keen (1993) , but in line with Cremer and Gahvari (2000) if we ignore the possibility of tax evasion. Finally, we do not assume free entry of …rms, but rather assume that the good is not just publicly funded but also publicly provided. Considering health care markets, we believe it is appropriate to restrict attention to a limited number of …rms (hospitals or physicians) rather than assuming that every consumer has a …rm at its doorstep.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our basic modelling framework. In Sections 3 and 4 we derive the …rst best and the centralised solutions, respectively.
In Section 5, we analyse the decentralised solution without patient mobility (Section 5.1) and with patient mobility under di¤erent payment systems (Section 5.2). Finally, in Section 6 we present some policy implications and concluding remarks.
Model
Consider a market for health care where consumers (patients) are uniformly distributed on a line L = [0; 1]. The market consists of two di¤erent regions, which can be interpreted either as two neighbouring countries or as two neighbouring regions within the same country. We will henceforth refer to the two regions as Region 1 and Region 2. Consumers located on the line segment L 1 = [0; 1 2 ] belong to Region 1 while the remaining consumers, located on the line segment L 2 = [ 1 2 ; 1], belong to Region 2. The market is served by two health care providers (hospitals) which are located at the endpoints of L; thus, the provider owned by Region 1 is located at 0 while the provider owned by Region 2 is located at 1. Each patient demands one unit of health care (one treatment). We assume 1 0 One can interpret this as an optimal (commodity) tax adjustment at the border; i.e., you are free to purchase the good in any country you like, but you will need to pay the home country commodity tax rate when 'importing' the good.
that health care provision is publicly funded through general income taxation and is free at the point of consumption. The utility of a patient who is located at x i 2 L i and is treated by the provider in Region j, located at z j , is given by
where v > 0 is the patient's gross utility of being treated, q j q is the quality o¤ered by the provider in Region j (with > 0 measuring the marginal utility of quality), t is marginal travelling cost, y is gross individual income and > 0 is a proportional tax rate. 11 The lower bound q represents the lowest possible quality the providers can o¤er without being charged with malpractice and is, for simplicity, normalised to 0. In addition to variable travelling costs, patients also face a …xed cost f > 0 of travelling outside their own region for treatment. We assume that there are two types of patients: a fraction 1 of the patients have a prohibitively high value of f and will always seek treatment from their local provider, while the remaining fraction have a low value of f and will (if allowed) travel to the neighbouring region if the quality of the treatment o¤ered there is su¢ ciently high. For simplicity, we set f = 0 for the latter type of patients and assume that the fraction is constant at each point in L. Thus, we can interpret as an exogenous measure of the degree of interjurisdictional patient mobility. The total patient mass is normalised to 1.
If Region i faces a demand for D i treatments, the cost of providing these treatments with a quality q i is given by
where c > 0 is the marginal cost of treatment (for a given quality) and i is a positive parameter that re ‡ects the cost of quality provision, where 12 While the marginal treatment cost is assumed to be constant and equal across the two regions, we assume that Region 1 has a superior technology for providing health care quality; i.e., 1 < 2 . We will therefore intermittently refer to Region 1 and Region 2 as the high-skill 1 1 We may also think of as the social insurance contribution set by the government. 1 2 For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of quality provision is independent of treatment volume, implying that quality is a public good for the patients of a hospital. This is a widely used assumption in the theoretical literature on quality competition between health care providers (see, e.g., Lyon, 1999; Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2002; Gravelle and Sivey, 2010). and low-skill regions, respectively. Several of our results in the subsequent analysis will be derived using the following quadratic form:
The …rst-best solution
As a benchmark for comparison, we start out by considering the …rst-best solution, where a utilitarian supraregional policy maker chooses the quality of each provider and also decides which patients are treated by which provider. Thus, the …rst-best outcome is given by the solution to the following problem:
subject to the budget constraint
Substituting the budget constraint into the objective function and maximising, yields the following …rst-order conditions:
By substituting for x f b , the …rst-order conditions for …rst-best quality provision can be written as
In each region, quality of health care should be provided until the point where the marginal bene…t is equal to the marginal cost. Since G q 1 < G q 2 for q 1 = q 2 , the …rst-best quality is higher in Region 1 than in Region 2, which implies that a higher number of patients are treated in Region 1 in the …rst-best solution. The di¤erences in quality levels and treatment volumes increase with the degree of patient mobility ( ). With quadratic quality costs, the …rst-best outcome is explicitly given by 13
which implies that the interregional patient ‡ow (from Region 2 to Region 1) in the …rst-best outcome is given by
The centralised solution
Now suppose that the two regions belong to the same health care jurisdiction, so that the quality of health care in each region is decided by a utilitarian central policy maker as in the previous section, but patients are free to choose their preferred provider (instead of being allocated by the central policy maker). Since patients do not pay for health care directly, the individual (among the mobile patients) who is indi¤erent between the provider in Region 1 and the provider in Region 2 is located at b x, implicitly given by 1 3 The second-order conditions are satis…ed if the matrix 2 6 6 4
The optimisation problem of the policy maker is now
subject to (4) . Let the optimal quality levels be denoted by q c i , i = 1; 2. It is straightforward to
show that the …rst-order conditions for this problem coincide with the ones that secure the …rst-best outcome, i.e., (8)- (9), implying q c i = q f b i , i = 1; 2. 14 By comparing (7) and (13), we see that
Thus, the centralised solution also achieves the …rst-best allocation of treated patients across the two regions.
Proposition 1
The optimal quality and number patients treated in each region under the centralised solution coincide with the …rst-best outcome, implying higher quality in the high-skill than the low-skill region and (some) patients travelling from the low-skill to the high-skill region.
Under the assumption of a uniform tax rate , implying that the tax bill is split evenly between tax payers in the two regions, regional welfare under the centralised solution can be written as
2 )]=y: Thus, welfare is higher in the region that provides the higher level of quality (i.e., Region 1). There are two sources of this regional welfare di¤erence: …rst, patients who are not treated in Region 1 su¤er a utility loss from the lower quality level in Region 2, 1 4 The second-order conditions are 2 2t
and, second, patients who travel from Region 2 to Region 1 to enjoy the higher quality level still su¤er a utility loss due to higher travelling costs. These two welfare losses are captured by, respectively, the second and third terms on the right-hand side of (16).
Decentralised health care provision
Suppose that the two regions belong to di¤erent jurisdictions. In each region, the optimal quality of health care is chosen to maximise the utility of patients living in that region (regardless of where they are treated), and the cost of health care provision in Region i is …nanced by a proportional income tax i levied on the region's tax payers. We will compare two environments where interregional patient mobility is allowed or not, starting with the latter case.
No patient mobility across jurisdictions
If patients are not allowed to seek treatment in another region, the optimisation problem of the policy maker in Region i is given by
The …rst-order condition for optimal quality provision under no mobility, denoted q n i , is
With decentralised health care provision, the quality of health care is still higher in Region 1 than in Region 2, due to the superior health care technology in the former region. By comparing (19) and (8)- (9) , it is straightforward to verify that q n 1 < q f b 1 and q n 2 > q f b 2 . Keeping in mind that x f b > 1 2 , we make the following conclusion:
Proposition 2 Compared with the …rst best solution, decentralisation without patient mobility is sub-optimal. In the high-skill (low-skill) region too few (many) patients are treated and the quality provided is too low (high).
Decentralisation without mobility is sub-optimal: the potentially mobile patients residing at the border between Region 1 and Region 2 would be willing to travel to Region 1 to obtain higher quality but are not allowed to do so, which in turn generates a welfare loss. In the absence of interregional patient mobility, the potential gains from the technological advantage of Region 1 are not fully exploited. In terms of aggregate utility across the two regions, it would have been more e¢ cient to increase the quality di¤erence even further and let the (mobile) patients in Region 2 who are located on the line segment [ 1 2 ; x f b ] travel to Region 1 for treatment. An implication of this ine¢ ciency is that total health care expenditures are too high in Region 2 and too low in Region 1.
We know from Proposition 1 that the …rst-best outcome can be implemented with centralised decisions on health care quality and free patient choice. However, even though total welfare across the two regions would be higher in a centralised solution, it is not necessarily the case that both regions would individually bene…t from centralised policy making with interregional patient mobility.
Regional welfare in the decentralised solution without mobility is given by
Whether Region 2 is better or worse o¤ under decentralisation depends on the sign of the following expression:
In a decentralised solution without patient mobility, immobile patients (with prohibitively high f )
and potentially mobile patients (with f = 0) who are located on [x f b ; 1] enjoy a higher quality of health care than they would have in the centralised solution. On the other hand, potentially mobile patients located on [ 1 2 ; x f b ] are deprived of access to higher-quality health care in Region 1 in the absence of patient mobility (since q n 2 < q f b 1 ). These two welfare e¤ects are represented by the …rst two terms in (21). In addition, the tax burden of residents in the two regions is generally di¤erent in the two solutions, as shown by the …nal two terms in (21). In the decentralised solution the cost of health care provision in Region 2 is higher, but, on the other hand, the residents of Region 2 do not need to take part in …nancing the higher health care costs of Region 1.
We can derive unambiguous regional welfare e¤ects with quadratic quality costs. In this case, equilibrium qualities in the decentralised solution without patient mobility are given by
Using (15)-(16) and (20), Region 2 is better o¤ in the decentralised regime if
which is true for all valid parameter con…gurations. 15 Since centralised policy making with mobility implements the …rst-best outcome, but Region 2 prefers decentralised policy making without mobility, then welfare in Region 1 must necessarily be higher in the centralised solution: 16
Proposition 3 Compared with decentralisation without patient mobility, the high-skill (low-skill) region is better (worse) o¤ under centralised policy-making with interregional patient mobility.
Thus, even if centralised policy making implements the …rst-best outcome, the low-skill region (Region 2) would not be willing to transfer authority to a central policy maker unless there is a system of compensation (e.g., an interregional income transfer policy) in place.
Notice that W n 2 W c 2 > 0 also for = 0. Thus, even if allowing for patient mobility does not actually lead to any out ‡ow of patients from Region 2 (which implies q n i = q f b i ), this region is still better o¤ under decentralised policy making. The reason is that, when health care is …nanced by uniform income taxation, tax payers in Region 2 must contribute to …nancing the higher health care expenditures in Region 1 in the centralised solution. 17 If allowing for patient mobility leads to an out ‡ow of patients from Region 2 in equilibrium (i.e., > 0), there are two additional welfare e¤ects of centralisation for Region 2: (i) lower utility for the patients who are treated in Region 2 (since q f b 2 < q n 2 ), and (ii) higher utility for the patients who travel to Region 1 for treatment
(since q f b 1 > q n 2 ). We can show that the …rst e¤ect dominates, implying that higher patient mobility 1 5 Notice that the numerator in (23) is positive due to the second-order conditions and q c 2 0. 1 6 Since W c 1 + W c 2 > W n 1 + W n 2 and W n 2 > W c 2 it follows that W c 1 > W n 1 . 1 7 Since the marginal cost of quality provision is lower in Region 1 than in Region 2, the corresponding higher quality level in Region 1 implies that the total cost of qualty provision is also higher in this region. Although this result holds for quadratic quality costs, it does not generalise to any convex cost function.
increases the welfare loss of centralisation for the low-skill region, if the degree of patient mobility (as measured by ) is su¢ ciently low to begin with. 18
Interjurisdictional patient mobility
This section derives quality choices and (regional and total) welfare when patients'mobility is allowed under four plausible scenarios: (i) no transfer system is in place; (ii) the transfer system sets the price equal to the marginal cost; (iii) the transfer price is determined to maximise total welfare (de…ned as the sum of regions'utility); (iv) the price paid by the exporting region is di¤erent from the price received by the importing region. We then address the following key question: compared to decentralisation without mobility, how does interjurisdictional patient mobility a¤ect quality choices and regional welfare? We also compare qualities under decentralisation and mobility with the …rstbest ones.
Suppose that individuals are free to choose the health care provider they prefer, regardless of whether the provider and the patient belong to the same health care jurisdiction. The two policy makers are assumed to choose the quality of health care in their respective regions non-cooperatively.
Since Region 1 has a superior technology for providing health care quality, there will be an out ‡ow of patients from the low-skill to the high-skill region in equilibrium. The size of this patient ‡ow is determined by the share of mobile patients ( ) and the location of the indi¤erent patient among these (b x). We assume that the health care provider in Region 1 cannot turn down patients who travel from Region 2 to obtain treatment. How is the health care to these patients paid for? Suppose that Region 2 pays a transfer to Region 1. We assume that this transfer takes the form of a price p for each of its own residents who are treated in Region 1. We will …rst derive the Nash equilibrium for any given p, and subsequently explore the four plausible pricing rules outlined above.
Anticipating that b
x > 1 2 in equilibrium, the optimisation problem of the policy maker in Region 1 is
subject to
. This expression is always positive if is su¢ ciently low.
while the optimisation problem of Region 2 is
Notice that the second term on the right-hand side of (25) represents the net revenue for Region 1 of treating patients from the neighbouring region, while the second term on the right-hand side of (27) represents the corresponding net cost for Region 2.
The …rst-order conditions that de…ne the Nash equilibrium under decentralisation and patient mobility, with equilibrium qualities denoted by q m i , i = 1; 2, are given by 19
In each region, the level of health care quality is chosen such that the marginal utility for the region's residents plus the marginal net revenue from interregional patient ‡ows are equal to the marginal cost of quality provision. In equilibrium, the health care quality is always higher in Region 1 than in Region 2, and the welfare in each region is given by
and
Before considering di¤erent rules for choosing p, let us …rst see how equilibrium qualities depend on the level of p. By totally di¤erentiating (28)-(29) and applying Cramer's rule, we can show that the equilibrium quality responses to a marginal increase in the transfer payment p are given by
Notice that the positive sign of @q m 2 =@p is determined by invoking the second-order conditions of the centralised optimisation problem. The intuition for the positive relationship between the transfer payment and equilibrium qualities in the two regions is reasonably straightforward. An increase in p makes it more pro…table for Region 1 to treat patients from Region 2, while it becomes more costly for Region 2 to pay for the treatment of these patients. All else equal, this gives the policy maker in Region 1 incentives to provide higher quality in order to attract more patients from the neighbouring region, while the policy maker in Region 2 has an incentive to increase quality in order to dampen the out ‡ow of patients. In other words, a higher transfer payment intensi…es quality competition between the two regions. This e¤ect is stronger the higher the share of mobile patients ( ) and the lower the travelling costs (t). With quadratic quality costs, equilibrium qualities in the two regions are given by
In the subsequent analysis, we investigate the four pricing rules mentioned at the beginning of this section.
No transfer payment
Suppose that there is no system of transfer payment in place; i.e., p = 0. The Nash equilibrium is then characterised by
Comparing with the case of decentralisation without mobility, (19), we see that patient mobility leads to lower health care quality in both regions: q m 1 < q n 1 and q m 2 < q n 2 : Since Region 1 is not compensated for the treatment of patients from Region 2, the policy maker in Region 1 has an incentive to reduce the quality in order to dampen the in ‡ow of such patients. At the same time, the policy maker in Compared with the …rst-best outcome, there is clearly underprovision of quality in Region 1, while the quality in Region 2 might be higher or lower than in the …rst-best solution. With quadratic quality costs, quality is underprovided also in Region 2 if
This condition holds if the marginal treatment costs (c) is su¢ ciently high relative to the marginal willingness-to-pay for quality ( ). The underprovision of quality in Region 1 also means that the interregional patient ‡ow is too small. 20
How does patient mobility a¤ect regional welfare? For Region 1, the welfare e¤ect of allowing interjurisdictional patient mobility is given by
Welfare in Region 1 is lower with mobility for two reasons. First, the quality of health care goes 2 0 The indi¤erent patient (among the mobile ones) is located at b
x (q m 1 ; q m 2 ) = t 2t 1 2 + 2 ( 2 1)
The comparison with the …rst-best solution is given by
down. The ensuing welfare loss of this drop in quality is given by the sum of the two …rst terms in (39). 21 Second, tax payers in Region 1 must pay for the treatment of patients travelling from Region 2, the cost of which is given by the third term.
For Region 2, the welfare e¤ect of patient mobility is a priori more ambiguous:
Mobility has three e¤ects on welfare in Region 2. First, quality goes down for the patients that are treated within the region. Second, since the ranking of q m 1 and q n 2 is ambiguous, the patients who take advantage of interregional mobility and seek treatment in Region 1 may enjoy higher or lower quality. 22 Third, the tax burden goes down since some of the health care expenditures are passed on to Region 1 through interregional patient mobility. The sum of the …rst and second e¤ect is given by the sum of the three …rst terms in (40), while the third e¤ect is given by the last term. Notice that, if 1 ! 2 , there is no interregional patient mobility in equilibrium and the second and third e¤ect vanish, implying that W m 2 W n 2 < 0. Due to continuity, mobility will lead to lower welfare in Region 2 also for a su¢ ciently small technology di¤erence ( 2 1 ) between the regions. With quadratic quality costs, however, the ambiguity is resolved and mobility leads to a welfare reduction for all valid parameter con…gurations:
Proposition 4 Under decentralisation, allowing for interjurisdictional patient mobility with p = 0 leads to lower quality and lower welfare in both regions. Compared with the …rst-best outcome, quality is always underprovided in the high-skill region and is also underprovided in the low-skill region if marginal treatment costs are su¢ ciently high relative to the marginal utility of health care quality.
Proposition 4 makes a clear case against allowing mobility if a transfer system is not in place. 2 1 Notice that
In other words, if the technological di¤erence between the regions is low relative to the marginal treatment cost, patient mobility leads to lower quality for all patients, including those patients who travel from the low-skill region to obtain health care in the high-skill region.
Under a decentralised solution with mobility, regions would have poor incentives to provide quality, which leads to low welfare in both regions.
Transfer payment equal to marginal cost
Suppose that the transfer payment is set equal to marginal treatment costs; i.e., p = c. In this case, the Nash equilibrium is characterised by
For Region 1, since the transfer payment exactly covers the cost of treating patients from the other region, the incentives to provide quality are una¤ected by whether interregional patient mobility is allowed or not, so that q m 1 = q n 1 . The policy maker in Region 2, on the other hand, has an incentive to reduce quality when interregional mobility is allowed. Since a fraction of the region's patients can obtain health care of higher quality in the neighbouring region, the marginal welfare gain of quality provision in Region 2 is lower, and regional welfare is thus maximised at a lower quality level, so that q m 2 < q n 2 .
Since patient mobility with p = c does not a¤ect quality incentives in Region 1, equilibrium quality in this region is underprovided relative to the …rst-best solution: q m 1 < q f b 1 . In Region 2, patient mobility reduces quality incentives and brings equilibrium quality closer to the …rst-best level in this region. However, comparing (9) and (43) we see that q m
which means that quality is still overprovided in Region 2.
Due to unchanged incentives for quality provision, allowing for interregional patient mobility has no e¤ect on welfare in Region 1, and W m 1 = W n 1 . In Region 2, the e¤ect is indeterminate:
Mobility a¤ects di¤erent types of patients di¤erently. Some patients from Region 2 get access to higher-quality health care in Region 1 (…rst term), while the remaining patients in Region 2 experience a drop in the quality of the health care they are o¤ered (second term) which implies a lower cost of quality provision (third term). Figure 1 shows graphically how di¤erent groups of patients are a¤ected: patients from Region 1 in area A are indi¤erent; patients from Region 2 in area B receive a higher quality while patients in area C receive a lower one.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Once more, we proceed to assuming quadratic quality costs, in which case the equilibrium is given by
(46) and the welfare e¤ect of mobility in Region 2 is
Thus, the gain of the patients who get access to higher-quality care in Region 1 outweighs the loss of the remaining patients who have to accept a quality degradation.
Proposition 5 Under decentralisation, allowing for interjurisdictional patient mobility with p = c has no e¤ ect on quality and welfare in the high-skill region, while quality goes down and welfare goes up in the low-skill region. Compared with the …rst-best outcome, quality is underprovided in the high-skill region and overprovided in the low-skill region.
Proposition 5 suggests that under decentralisation with mobility a transfer system which sets the price equal to the marginal treatment cost can generate a (weak) Pareto improvement compared to decentralisation without mobility. The high-skill region is indi¤erent between mobility and no mobility because the price covers the marginal cost of treating the patients. The low-skill region bene…ts since patients moving to the high-skill region receive higher quality, despite the reduction of quality for the patients who do not move.
Since there are both winners and losers from mobility within the low-skill region, we can paint a more detailed picture of the welfare e¤ects of mobility in this region by assessing the relative sizes of these two groups of patients. Notice that, among the potentially mobile patients (with f = 0)
in Region 2, a patient who is located to the left (right) of e x is better (worse) o¤ with than without mobility, where e x is implicitly given by
With quadratic quality costs, the location of the patient who is indi¤erent between mobility and no mobility is given by
Since patients are uniformly distributed, with a mass of 1 2 in each region, the winners from mobility outnumber the losers if
It is reasonably straightforward to show that a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for this inequality to hold is
This condition does not hold if there are su¢ ciently few potentially mobile patients, if travelling costs are su¢ ciently high, or if the marginal utility of quality is su¢ ciently low, and it is less likely to hold if the skill-di¤erence between the two regions is su¢ ciently low. Thus, even if mobility leads to higher total welfare in the low-skill region, the losers from mobility will nevertheless outnumber the winners if the condition given in (50) does not hold. One possible implication of this is that the low-skill region could still block the implementation of patient mobility, if this decision is based on a process that re ‡ects the relative number of winners and losers from the proposed policy (e.g., majority voting).
Optimal transfer payment
The optimal transfer payment for patients who seek treatment in a di¤erent region is a price p that maximises total welfare in the two regions. Comparing …rst-best quality provision with equilibrium quality provision under decentralisation and patient mobility, i.e., comparing (8)-(9) with (28)-(29), we see that a price p = c+ q f b 1 q f b 2 will yield …rst-best quality provision in Region 1 but overprovision of quality in Region 2. Thus, the …rst-best outcome cannot be implemented with decentralised policy making. Since equilibrium quality provision in both regions is monotonically increasing in p, the optimal transfer payment must thus necessarily imply underprovision (overprovision) of quality in the high-skill (low-skill) region.
With quadratic quality costs, equilibrium quality provision under decentralisation and patient mobility is given by (34)-(35). In order to …nd the optimal transfer payment, we substitute these equilibrium quality expressions into the regional welfare functions and maximise total welfare with respect to p, yielding
A …rst observation is that the optimal price is higher than marginal treatment costs. Thus, in order to maximise total welfare, the high-skill region must earn a strictly positive (marginal) pro…t from treating patients from the low-skill region. Notice also that a higher patient mobility ( ) increases the optimal price. Increased patient mobility implies that a larger number of patients in Region 2 are potentially willing to travel to Region 1 to obtain higher-quality treatment. In terms of total welfare, this increases the marginal welfare gain of quality provision in Region 1. However, since this extra welfare gain accrue to patients residing in Region 2, and the policy maker in Region 1 does not take this gain into account, a higher payment for these patients is needed in order to provide the correct incentives for quality provision in the high-skill region.
With optimal transfer payments, the quality provision in equilibrium is given by
The e¤ects of patient mobility on health care provision in the two regions are given by
Thus, with optimal transfer payments, allowing for interjurisdictional patient mobility will increase quality provision in the high-skill region and reduce quality provision in the low-skill region. Still, compared with the …rst-best outcome, there is overprovision (underprovision) in the former (latter) region.
The regional welfare e¤ect of patient mobility turns out to be positive for Region 1:
Although quality is provided at a level where the marginal bene…t for the patients living in Region 1 is lower than the marginal cost of quality provision, this is more than compensated for by the pro…t that the region makes from treating patients that travel from Region 2. 23 For Region 2, the welfare e¤ect of mobility is given by
Allowing for patient mobility implies that the quality o¤ered to the patients who are treated in Region 2 goes down. In addition, the tax payers in Region 2 have to …nance part of the health care expenditures of the neighbouring region in the form of a transfer payment in excess of marginal treatment costs for the patients who seek health care outside the region. The higher quality of care enjoyed by these patients is not su¢ cient to fully compensate for the above mentioned welfare losses and the welfare of Region 2 is consequently reduced as a result of interjurisdictional patient mobility with optimal transfer payments. 24
Proposition 6 Under decentralisation, allowing for interjurisdictional patient mobility with transfer 2 3 The positive sign of W m 1 W n 1 is established by noticing that the numerator in (56) is monotonically increasing in t :
Setting t at the lowest permissible value, t = 2 2 1 , yields
> 0: 2 4 The negative sign of W m 2 W n 2 is established by noticing that the numerator in (57) is monotonically decreasing in t : payments that maximise total welfare leads to higher (lower) quality and welfare in the high-skill (lowskill) region. Compared with the …rst-best outcome, quality is underprovided in the high-skill region and overprovided in the low-skill region.
In contrast to the result obtained in Proposition 5, allowing for mobility in a decentralised system with transfer prices that maximise global welfare is not a Pareto improvement, despite generating an overall increase in welfare. It is the low-skill region which will oppose mobility: despite the increase in quality for the mobile patients, the price paid to the high-skill region is too high.
Transfer payments with two prices
The above analysis showed that the …rst-best outcome cannot be implemented under a decentralised regime with a single transfer price, even if this price is optimally chosen. In the following, we check whether we can get closer to the …rst-best solution by designing a transfer payment scheme with two di¤erent prices. We show that we cannot.
Suppose that Region 2 pays p 2 , while Region 1 receives p 1 , for each patient from Region 2 seeking treatment in Region 1. If p 1 6 = p 2 , what Region 2 pays is not equal to what Region 1 receives. If p 1 > p 2 , more tax revenues need to be raised; if p 1 < p 2 , there is an extra surplus that can be distributed to tax payers. Since the number of patients travelling from Region 2 to Region 1 to seek treatment is b
x 1 2 , the extra tax bill, in the case of p 1 > p 2 , is (p 1 p 2 ) b x 1 2 . We assume that tax payers in Region 1 pay a share of this extra bill, while tax payers in Region 2 pay the remaining share 1 .
With this new transfer payment scheme, the policy maker in Region 1 maximises (24) subject to the new budget constraint
Setting t at the lowest permissible level, t = 2 2 1 , yields
while the policy maker in Region 2 maximises (26) subject to
The …rst-order conditions that de…ne the Nash equilibrium are
Comparing (28)-(29) with (60)-(61) we see that a transfer payment scheme with two di¤erent prices cannot improve upon the equilibrium outcome with a single, optimally chosen, transfer price p . For any pair of prices, (p 1 ; p 2 ), a uniform price p = (1 ) p 1 + p 2 yields exactly the same outcome in terms of equilibrium qualities. This is true regardless of the value of , i.e., regardless of how the extra tax bill is shared between the two regions.
The reason for this result is that both prices have a qualitatively similar impact on equilibrium quality in both regions; more speci…cally, an increase in either of the two prices leads to higher quality in both regions. An increase in p 1 has two e¤ects on quality incentives in Region 1. It increases both the revenues from treating out-of-region patients and the extra tax revenues needed to …nance the transfer payment scheme. However, since the extra tax burden is shared between the two regions, the …rst e¤ect always dominates. For Region 2, an increase in p 1 has only one e¤ect; it increases the tax burden due to a higher cost of the transfer payment scheme and therefore gives an incentive to provide higher quality in order to dampen the demand for out-of-region treatments.
An increase in p 2 has qualitatively similar e¤ects. It becomes more costly for Region 2 to pay for out-of-region treatments, but the tax burden also goes down since the cost of the transfer payment system is reduced. However, since the gain from a lower tax burden is shared with tax payers in Region 1, the …rst e¤ect dominates and equilibrium quality goes up in Region 2. The same happens in Region 1, since the indirect cost of treating out-of-region patients -in the form of higher taxes to …nance the transfer payment scheme -is reduced when p 2 goes up.
Proposition 7 Under decentralisation, a transfer payment with two prices, where the price paid by the low-skill region is di¤ erent from the price received by the high-skill region, does not increase welfare compared to a transfer payment with one price.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care …nancing (taxation) and social welfare. Our analysis has been motivated by the new EU legislation that aims at stimulating patient mobility across EU member states, but the analysis applies also to patient mobility within countries with separate regional jurisdictions, like in Canada, Italy or Sweden, among others. To study the e¤ects of patient mobility, we made use of a Hotelling model with two regions (countries) that di¤er in health care quality technology, patients that decide which region to demand medical treatment, and policy makers that decide on the health care quality and income taxation in their region. Based on this set up, we compared the decentralised solution without patient mobility (the old system within the EU) with (i) the centralised solution with patient mobility (the optimal system) and (ii) the decentralised solution with patient mobility (the new system within the EU).
We …rst showed that the centralised solution with patient mobility implements the …rst best.
However, this case is not feasible for two reasons: …rst, the low-skill region gets lower welfare compared with the decentralised solution without patient mobility and is thus not willing to transfer authority to an interregional policy maker (the EU). Second, the centralised solution implies that an interregional policy maker (the EU) takes over the health care …nancing directly, which is a highly unlikely scenario at the moment.
We then analysed the decentralised solution with patient mobility under various transfer payment schemes across the regions. The 'worst-case' scenario is when there is no transfer payments, since patient mobility then leads to a 'race-to-the-bottom'e¤ect in terms of health care quality, implying lower welfare in both regions compared with no patient mobility. Thus, in absence of transfer payments both regions will oppose patient mobility. This situation is likely to describe the current EU situation with no clear payment rules and thus very low patient mobility.
The 'feasible-case'scenario is when the transfer payment is set equal to the marginal treatment cost. In this case we have a weak Pareto improvement, where the low-skill region bene…ts from access to treatment in the high-skill region, whereas the welfare in the high-skill region is unchanged since the provider is fully compensated for the extra treatment cost through the transfer payment. Notice, however, that the scope for a weak Pareto improvement is de…ned at regional level. Despite the low-skill region being overall better o¤ under this pricing system, we can identify a group of winners and a group of losers: the winners belong to a subgroup of the patients who travel to the high-skill region and bene…t from the higher quality (the ones living closer to the border), while the remaining patients in Region 2 will lose from allowing mobility. If the group of losers is su¢ ciently large, a move to a system with mobility where the price equals the marginal cost may be politically unsustainable in the low-skill region despite the potential welfare improvement.
The 'best-case'scenario is when the transfer price is set to maximise joint regional welfare. We showed that the socially optimal transfer price is higher than the marginal treatment cost, and brings the outcome closer to (but not at) the …rst best. The high-skill region bene…ts since health care quality and welfare is higher, but the low-skill region loses because of the higher taxes needed to …nance the high-quality care to residents seeking care in the high-skill region. We also showed that a more complex payment system, with di¤erent (optimal) prices to the two regions cannot solve the problem. Thus, optimal transfer pricing is not a feasible scenario, since the low-skill region would oppose patient mobility (unless there is an interregional income transfer system in place).
The policy implications that can be drawn from our analysis are two-fold. First, patient mobility is bene…cial for global (interregional) welfare when regions di¤er in their health care quality. However, patient mobility might reduce regional welfare because of the 'race-to-the-bottom'e¤ect in terms of health care quality or the high income taxation that is needed to fund high-quality treatment to patients travelling across regions. In a decentralised regime with separate jurisdictions, the scope for patient mobility is reduced to the locus of situations that result in (weak) Pareto improvements for the regions.
Second, the success of imposing patient mobility (like the new EU legislation) crucially depends on the transfer payment system. In absence of any payments, the outcome is either no mobility, where patients seeking cross-border care are denied access, or mobility with a 'race-to-the-bottom'e¤ect on health care quality. In presence of a payment system, the transfer price needs to be su¢ ciently high, so that the provider is compensated from the extra cost of treating patients from another region.
Otherwise, the provider would refuse to treat patients or reduce quality in order to lower demand from mobile patients. However, the price cannot be too high either, as this would imply high tax rates to …nance the high-quality treatment to patients demanding cross-border care.
The new EU legislation states that patients seeking care in another member state are entitled to reimbursement covered by the health insurance plan in the patients'home country. However, the design of the transfer payment system is not speci…ed by the new EU law, but to a large extent left to the member states to decide. Based on our study, we expect to see patient mobility occurring only between countries with a (weakly) mutual bene…t from this trade of health care services. If the EU is enforcing the rights for patients to obtain health care in another country, without establishing a proper transfer payment system, the impact on health care quality and …nancing might be detrimental not just to regional welfare but also to global (interregional) welfare.
By way of conclusion, we would like to point out some limitations of our study. First, we focus on patient mobility motivated by di¤erences in the health care quality across regions. While we think this is a main motivation for (planned) cross-border health care demand, there might be other sources as well. For instance, patients might travel to another country for treatments that are not available in their home country. Notably, the new EU law says that the patients are not eligible to reimbursement for treatments not covered by the health insurance plan in the home country, implying that such treatments would have to be covered out-of-pocket. This kind of cross-border health care demand has been in place for many years, but seems to be of limited scope according to the very low …gures of patient mobility. We have therefore not addressed this issue in our paper.
Second, we have assumed that the income level is the same across and within regions, and that utility is linear in income (i.e., patients are risk neutral). As long as utility is linear in income, allowing for regional di¤erences in income would not play any role for our analysis. The reason is that patient mobility, as de…ned by the marginal patient, does not depend on di¤erences in income levels. Notably, we could re-interpret the fraction of mobile (immobile) patients as the rich (poor) patients, which are able (not able) to cover the cost of seeking care in another region. Mobility would then be higher (lower), the higher (lower) the share of rich patient living in the low-skill region.
However, we …nd this to be a rather trivial result. Introducing income di¤erences into the model should be done in a more elaborate way, especially by allowing for utility to be concave in income (i.e., risk-averse patients). We could also allow for di¤erent income distributions in the two regions.
While this could be an interesting study, it is well beyond the scope of the current paper and thus left for future research. 
